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Abstract
Motivated by the relationship between foreign ownership and firm-level performances 
in emerging countries, we select Vietnam’s listed market as the context for this empirical 
setting. We find that there is a significant inverted U shaped relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performances. The non-monotonic relationship is consistent with 
corporate governance theory on the gains from monitoring effects by shareholders or the 
losses from expropriations when their ownership exceeds a certain large level. Furthermore, 
we find that foreign investors disfavor firms with high concentration of ownership that relates 
to image of weak corporate governance. Lastly, there are also evidences that foreign investors 
are likely to invest in firms with good financial performances, large size, low level of debts, in 
pharmaceutical industry, and listed in higher liquid stock exchange. 
Keywords: foreign ownership, ownership structure, corporate governance, performance, 
Vietnam. 
JEL classification: G34, G39, L20.
I. Introduction
In the context of increased globalization of capital markets, many countries have 
gradually opened up their capital market to attract foreign investors (Bekaert and Harvey, 
2000; Dahlquist et al., 2003). As a result, foreign ownership not only contributes to the 
development of capital market or the economic development of emerging countries, but has 
also become important actors in domestic ownership structure systems (Claessens, 1993; 
Errunza, 2001 and Ahmadjian et al., 2005). The question of whether foreign equity ownership 
relates with better firm-level performances is thus still a hotly debated subject in many 
countries. Corporate governance theory suggests incentive (monitoring) and entrenchment 
(pursuance of private benefits) effects of large shareholdings (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; 
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Claessens et al., 2002). There are also evidences indicating an inverted U shaped relationship 
between management or insider ownership and firm market valuation (Morck et al, 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Particularly, some studies suggest curvilinear association 
between ownership held by foreign investors and firm-level performances (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1999; Ferris and Park, 2005). 
Aim at providing more evidences on the subject of foreign ownership, this study 
examines the relationship between ownership by foreign investors and firm-level 
performances. We use data of listed nonfinancial firms in Vietnam market(1) from 2006-2010 for 
the study. According to existing regulations of the market, foreign investors can own up to 30% 
or 49% total shares of financial or nonfinancial firms, respectively. 
We find that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm performances measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The non-monotonic relationship is 
consistent with corporate governance theory on benefits from monitoring by shareholders 
and damages from expropriation when ownership of the shareholders reaches a certain large 
level (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). In addition, the results are also in line with those of 
Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Ferris and Park (2005) that find inverted 
U shaped relationship between insider (manager or foreigner) ownership and market value 
performance. Especially, Khanna and Palepu (1999) additionally provide evidences that foreign 
investors play efficient monitoring roles in emerging market. Based on market’s context 
of the study, the results can be interpreted that foreign investors with minority ownership 
may play effective monitoring roles to mitigate agency problems of existing controlling 
shareholders; in contrast, the foreign investors with majority shareholder powers may connect 
with expropriations which will harm firm performances. The relationship is likely to be more 
sensitive in emerging economies with poor shareholder protection mechanisms. Furthermore, 
we find that foreign investors disfavor firms with high concentration of ownership that relates 
to image of weak corporate governance. Importantly, we find that foreign investors prefer 
high-performing firms, which supports argument on the causality relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performances. Lastly, we also find significant evidence on determinants of 
foreign ownership such as firm size, debt level, types of industry and listing location.
(1) We consider Vietnam an appropriate market for the study because the market has several special 
institutional aspects determining effects of foreign ownership on firm-level performance such as poor 
shareholder protection mechanisms, low transparency (The World Bank, 2006; McGee, 2008). In 
addition, Vietnam is seen as one of frontier emerging markets and its nascent capital market is attracting 
special attention from foreign investors (Thanh and Quang, 2008; VCS, 2012). 
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The study emphasizes more on relevant subjects of corporate governance, ownership 
structure, roles and impacts of certain shareholders, herein foreign owners, on the firms 
rather than aims at areas of investment valuation or investment strategy. The study 
contributes to current body of literature on the subject of foreign ownership in following 
aspects. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study may be one of the very first indications 
examining effects of foreign ownership on firm-level performances in Vietnam, an emerging 
country with nascent capital market and a least reached country for empirical studies in 
business-management disciplines. Second, we provide evidences that large foreign ownership 
in listed firms do not always associate with higher or more added benefits. The effects of 
foreign investors as firm shareholders should be thus evaluated with caution especially in 
environments with weak corporate governance and poor institutional aspects. 
The study is organized as follows. Next section reviews the literature. Section 3 provides 
several features about Vietnam’s equity market and foreign investor. Section 4 describes data 
and basic statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results and additional tests. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the study.
II. Literature review
2.1 Foreign ownership and firm performances
Relationship of ownership structure and corporate value is widely discussed subjects 
in previous corporate governance literature. Classical studies of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest benefits of shareholders with large ownership by 
providing arguments that large shareholders have strong incentives to monitor managers, 
thus mitigate agency problems, which helps to maximize their firm’s value. On the other 
hand, large shareholders can also relate to negative impacts on firm value. For example, large 
shareholders can pursue their own private interests that contradict those of other minority 
shareholders or those of employees and managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Therefore, 
it can be said that the relationship between ownership structure and corporate value is an 
empirical issue (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). 
In addition, previous studies also examine the effects of management ownership and 
firm value. Berle and Means (1932) indicate that managers with little ownership can deploy 
managerial control for their private benefits rather than those of shareholders. For example, 
the managers can pursue non-value-maximizing objectives such as empire building and sales 
growth at the expense of other shareholders. Empirically, Morck et al. (1988) find a non-
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monotonic relationship between management ownership and firm market valuation. The 
authors argue that managerial ownership relates to higher firm market performance, but after 
a certain point of ownership, the managers become entrenched and execute decisions that 
are not for the benefit of other shareholders. Furthermore, McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
provide supporting evidences for the non-monotonic relationship by suggesting that there 
is a curvilinear relationship between ownership by corporate insiders and firm value. Firm 
value increases until the insider ownership reaches 40%-50%, then after the levels, firm value 
decreases. Alltogether, Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) suggest that there are gains from 
monitoring roles or losses from expropriation exercised by different types of shareholders 
depending on level of ownership they hold. 
In the context of deeper integration of capital markets, many countries have gradually 
opened the door of their market to attract foreign investment, and foreign ownership varies 
across countries with different corporate governance mechanism and legal system (Bekaert 
and Harvey, 2000; Dahlquist et al., 2003). Although several obstacles preventing cross border 
investment still exist, foreign investors can now invest in most of the host countries directly 
or through mutual funds (Kang and Stulz, 1997). Foreign investors have gradually become 
important actors in domestic ownership structure systems (Ahmadjian et al., 2005). There 
are recent studies that emphasize on the relationship between ownership by foreign investor 
and firm market performance (Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Ferris and Park, 2005; Nakano and 
Nguyen, 2012). 
Going into detail, Khanna and Palepu (1999) examine roles of foreign investors in India, 
an emerging economy. The authors discuss several aspects of India, particularly focusing on 
the lack of monitoring mechanism in the country’s market. They find that foreign investors 
play valuable monitoring roles in their research context. In addition, Ferris and Park (2005) 
find that there is a curvilinear relation between firm value and the percentage of equity owned 
by foreign investors in Japan. Firm value raises and then declines after foreign ownership 
reaches approximately 40%. Relying on previous corporate governance theory, Ferris and 
Park (2005) argue that manager-owner foreigners with their increased ownership may relate 
to entrenchment effects and act toward their managerial benefits against those of other 
shareholders. Also using data from Japan, Nakano and Nguyen (2012)(2) find positive linear 
(2) In their study, it is possible to observe that foreign investors are generally non-controlling shareholders 
in majority of Japanese firms. Therefore, results of their study that show positive relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm value are relatively similar to the results of Ferris and Park (2005) who also 
point out benefits of minority foreign shareholders.
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association between foreign ownership and firm value in electronic industry. The authors 
suggest that foreign investors can bring added values by stamping out (or constraining) 
suboptimal behaviors of Japanese firms, thus playing certain governance roles to benefit their 
invested – firms.
Consistent with monitoring effects of foreign investors found in Khanna and Palepu 
(1999), and with positive side of foreign ownership suggested by Ferris and Park (2005), 
there are other evidences on the roles of foreign ownership on improvement of corporate 
governance. Kim et al. (2010) suggest that foreign investors in Korea are important catalysts 
in improving corporate governance. Furthermore, Gul et al. (2010), Mishra and Ratti (2011) 
indicate that foreign ownership in China relates to implemented actions toward better 
corporate governance practices. Specifically, their studies argue that roles of foreign indirect 
investors in listed firms are smaller when the firms are still being controlled by the State. 
Lastly, Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) support positive roles of foreign board members. They 
argue that the appearance of foreign board members is a signal for stronger commitments 
toward transparency and more advanced corporate governance. However, Anachotikul (2006) 
argues that foreign investors may pursue their potential private benefits at the expenses of 
other shareholders in the firm if their ownership is large enough to do so. They may also 
retain weak corporate governance with insufficient monitoring to create conditions which 
allow them to expropriate benefits from the firm. 
Overall, based on the above evidences from previous literatures, there can be a 
hypothesis on the relationship between ownership by foreign investors and firm performances 
as illustrated by the inverted U shaped graph: firm performances increase until foreign 
ownership reaches a turning point, and after a certain level of ownership, firm performances 
declines.
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Graph 1: Hypothetical relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances
- Gains from monitoring  
- Improvement in 
corporate governance 
(Performances increase) 
Turning point 
Foreign (shareholders) ownership 
Performances 
- Losses from expropriation  
- Entrenchment effects  
- Non-value-maximizing 
objectives 
- Empire building 
(Performances decrease)  
Last but not least, in their research, Ferris and Park (2005), Anachotikul (2006) and 
Nakano and Nguyen (2012) argue that there might be a causality relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performances. In fact, foreign ownership may choose firm with 
good corporate governance to invest in (Kim et al., 2010). Therefore, issues of the causality 
relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances (and corporate governance) 
may overestimate the impacts of foreign ownership to the firm, which thus can be a serious 
matter when conducting research on the subject of foreign ownership. 
2.2 Determinants of foreign ownership 
Khanna and Palepu (1999) find that foreign investors are less likely to invest in firm 
groups that have weak corporate governance. Consistent to this argument, Giannetti and 
Simonov (2006) suggest that investors who enjoy only security benefits are reluctant to 
hold stocks in firms that show weak corporate governance and high probability of private 
benefit extraction. Indeed, questions of which firm characteristics determine level of foreign 
ownership are received attention from firm managers, market regulators and researchers, 
especially in emerging countries with newly-opened market. In their well-known study, 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) examine determinants of ownership structure in firm. Their study 
suggests that size and value of the firm, shareholder’s intention to control the firm, regulations 
(risks) and nature of industry are determinants affecting the ownership structure of the firm. 
Interestingly, their study does not reveal any relationship between foreign ownership and 
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firm financial performance. This finding seems not to be consistent with common beliefs 
that foreign investors always pay attention to firm financial performance (profitability) 
before investing. In more detail, Kang and Stulz (1997), Lin and Shiu (2003) argue that 
foreign investors seem to favor firms which are in manufacturing industries, demonstrate 
less ownership concentration, show high accounting performance, have large size, bear low 
financial risk, and maintain high leverage. These findings also vary across countries with 
different economic and institutional conditions. 
III. Overview of Vietnam equity market and foreign investor
Vietnamese securities market was officially inaugurated after the establishment of 
Ho Chi Minh Securities Trading Center (HOSE) on 20 July 2000. In 2005, Hanoi Securities 
Trading Center (HNX) was incorporated with only 9 firms listed. Meanwhile, there were only 
32 firms listed in HOSE in 2005. During the last ten years, market capitalization to GDP is less 
than 20%(3), which was among the lowest in the Asia region. However, Vietnam equity market 
is seen as one of the fastest growing investment destinations, which is partly supported by 
privatization programs of the government(4) (Merrill Lynch, 2006). As a result, at the end of 
2011, there are nearly 800 companies listed in the two Stock Exchanges with approximately 
40% of market cap to GDP. The significant increase in number of listed companies and market 
size derive from the fact that (i) privatization progress of state-owned enterprises is more 
aggressively implemented, (ii) private sector starts recognizing importance of stock market as 
a newly effective channel for mobilizing inside and outside capitals along with the traditional 
way of bank borrowings, (iii) especially, there is a large foreign indirect investment inflow to 
the nascent market, which is proved by increased existence of foreign investment funds and 
rapid growth in number of trading accounts of foreign individuals and institutions (HSBC, 
2012). There are also evidences showing that Vietnam continues to be an attractive investment 
destination (HSBC, 2012)(5). According to a new set of rankings published by Bloomberg 
(2012), Vietnam has been assessed as the top attractive “frontier” market. In addition, 
VCS (2012) shows that Vietnam is one of the few countries that demonstrates net foreign 
investment in-outflow and experiences less volatility in the amount of foreign investment. 
(3) Market capitalization to GDP accelerated from 1.2% in 2005 to 37.6% in 2009.
(4) See “Asian Insights – 2 Feb 2006” of Merrill Lynch (Merrill Lynch, 2006) for more details.
(5) HSBC (2012) shows that valuations of Vietnam’s market seem reasonable: “…VN index’s trailing PE is 
at 38% discount to Asia ex Japan and a 27% discount to MSCI Emerging Market…” 
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This supports the expectation that foreign investors will keep eyeing Vietnam as a long-term 
investment destination with lots of opportunities and perspectives.
 Along with the development of the equity market, Vietnam’s State Securities 
Commission issued regulations to control and supervise the market operation and its players. 
Among the regulations, there are some that relate to foreign investors. According to Securities 
Law in Vietnam, foreign investors are generally allowed to own up to 49% and 30% in non-
financial and financial-related firms, respectively. The restriction prevents further participation 
of foreign investors in firms and decrease liquidity of firm’s shares. In addition, there are 
large numbers of listed firms which are used to be former wholly state-owned firms and the 
state ownership is still significantly largest(6). For these firms, the proportions of shares that 
are freely available for trading are modest. It also prevents the expected ownership ratio of 
foreign investors. On average, foreign ownership in Vietnam listed firms is approximate 10% 
to 13% (VCS, 2012). In spite of the continued efforts of the market regulators, legal framework, 
corporate governance such as monitoring and shareholder protection mechanism of the 
country’s market, are weak and necessarily required for further improvement (IFC, 2010). 
IV. Data
4.1 Data collection
Our sample consists of 407 nonfinancial listed firms with a total of 1262 firm-year 
observations from 2006-2010. We collected financial performance ratios, foreign ownership, 
government ownership, and governance information of listed non-financial firms in two stock 
exchanges of Vietnam’s market. In the study, foreign ownership is the main variable which is 
defined as the aggregate number of shares held by foreign investors in the listed firms. 
We rely on OSIRIS, a professional data provider, to collect financial performance ratios 
of the listed firms. From the OSIRIS, important performance ratios such as Return on Assets 
and Return on Equities are automatically obtained. We also collect other year-end financial 
accounting indicators including Solvency, Sales, and Assets from the same source. To acquire 
foreign ownership and government ownership data, we use year-end versions (31/12) of Daily 
Securities Exchange Bulletins issued by Vietnamese two stock exchanges (HOSE and HNX) 
for the information. From the Bulletins, we can also have data on stock price and outstanding 
shares of the listed firms to calculate market capitalization. Lastly, governance information 
(6) Around 74% listed firms are former State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and are still under majority control 
of the State.
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of the listed firms such as years of listing, firm age, listing locations, Family firms, and State 
firms are derived from company profile in websites of GBIC Company, BIDV Securities 
Company (BSC) and VNEXPRESS (for identities of Family firms).
4.2 Definition and use of firm performances
We use Tobin’s Q that reflects firm growth opportunities as a measurement of market-
based performance. The Tobin’s Q(7) is widely used in empirical studies of McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), Chung and Pruitt (1994), Khanna and Palepu (1999), Oxelheim and Randoy 
(2003), Ferris and Park (2005), Nakano and Nguyen (2012). As the calculation used in 
Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
ratio of market capitalization to book value of total assets. We also use ROA measured by net 
income to total assets and ROE measured by net income to total equities as additional financial 
performance indicators.
4.3 Calculation of weighted foreign ownership index
We follow Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Chan et al. (2009) and Kim et al., (2010) to 
estimate the weighted foreign ownership index. Use of the weighted index is expected to take 
into account the differences in investment amounts by foreign investors in each firm relative to 
market portfolio. It is noted that the weighted index reflects percentage of foreign ownership 
in term of value and it is thus not as appropriate as normal foreign ownership to reflect level of 
control. The weighted index is calculated in a formula as follows:
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that has a minimum value of -1 and maximum value of 1.42. Its average value of -0.50 means that on 
average, foreign investors invest less into their interested firms relative to the market portfolio. We also 
see that average value of Tobin’s Q is relatively small and close to 1. Average ROA which reflects firm 
financial performance is 7.47%. Average firm size measured by book value of assets is VND 946 billion 
(~US$47.3 million). High standard deviation of firm value of assets reflects high dispersion in firm scale. 
However, size of Vietnam’s listed firms is still relatively small versus international and regional 
standards. Average market capitalization of a Vietnam’s listed firm was approximately US$59.5 
million at the end of 2010, which was much smaller than US$432 million and US$619 million of a 
Malaysia’s and a Indonesia’s listed firm, respectively (Nguyen et al., 2012).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations from 2006 to 2010 
Variables Definition Mean Median SD 
 i  the ov r l market capitalization of all firms. The weighted index reflects 
ratio of foreign ownership percentage of firm i over value-weighted foreign ownership of the 
total market. Negative weighted index means that foreign investors invest more in firm i 
comparing to market portfolio; inconstant, positive index implies that foreign investors invest 
less in firm i relative to market portfolio. Alltogether, apart from normal foreign ownership 
(7) See Chung and Pruitt (1994) for more details of Tobin’s Q estimations. 
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ratio, we use the weighted foreign ownership index as an additional ratio in robustness check 
as it can further examine the relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances.  
4.4 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables in the sample. More detail of foreign 
ownership will be shown in Table 2. Important information of the Table 1 is the weighted 
foreign ownership index that has a minimum value of -1 and maximum value of 1.42. Its 
average value of -0.50 means that on average, foreign investors invest less into their interested 
firms relative to the market portfolio. We also see that average value of Tobin’s Q is relatively 
small and close to 1. Average ROA which reflects firm financial performance is 7.47%. Average 
firm size measured by book value of assets is VND 946 billion (~US$47.3 million). High 
standard deviation of firm value of assets reflects a high dispersion in firm scale. However, 
the size of Vietnam’s listed firms is still relatively small versus international and regional 
standards. Average market capitalization of a Vietnam’s listed firm was approximately US$59.5 
million at the end of 2010, which was much smaller than US$432 million and US$619 million of 
a Malaysia’s and a Indonesia’s listed firm, respectively (Nguyen et al., 2012). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all firm-year observations from 2006 to 2010
Variables Definition Mean Median SD
Fow Percentage of foreign ownership (%) 10.00 4.00 13.00 
Weighted Fow Market-weighted average foreign ownership -0.50 -0.82 0.66
Tobin’s Q Market-based performance (a proxy of firm value) measured 
by market capitalization to book value of total assets
0.86 0.54 0.98 
ROA Return on Assets measured by net incomes to assets (%) 7.47 6.28 8.47 
Assets Firm book value of assets (billion VND) 946 349 1,940
Equity/Assets Equity to Asset ratio 49.24 47.08 22.32 
Gow Percentage of government ownership (%) 28.00 28.00 23.00 
Firm_age Firm age since firm incorporation (years) 23.01 18.00 15.82 
List_year Year when firm lists 2006.41 2006 1.96 
List_place =1 if firm lists in Ho Chi Minh, 0 in Hanoi stock exchange 0.51 1.00 1.00
Note: Firm_age, List_year and Assets will be in the form of logarithm when used as variables in later 
regressions.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for foreign ownership. Average foreign ownership 
is 10%. Approximate 50% of listed firms in the sample have foreign ownership less than 3.5%, 
which shows very low existence of foreign investors in many firms of the market. There are 
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25% and 5% number of listed firms having foreign ownership of larger than 13.9% and 43.2%, 
respectively. In general, majority of firms (75%) have small level of foreign ownership (less 
than 14%). According to financial regulations in the country’s market, there is a limitation on 
foreign ownership in listed firms. Maximum foreign ownership in non-financial and financial 
sectors is 49% and 30%, respectively. In addition, shareholders with 10% ownership can have 
certain power to influence firm-related issues. 
Table 2: Distribution of foreign ownership, Unit: %
N Min p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p95 Max
Foreign ownership 1259 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 3.5 13.9 43.2 49.0
Note: p5...p95 representing 5%...95% percentile, respectively.
It is noticeable that average foreign ownership level is decreasing from 15.68% in 2006 
to 10.15% in 2008 and to 7.60% in 2010. However, with the rapid development of the country’s 
stock market, there are large numbers of firms listed in recent years. (Thanh and Quang, 
2008) Therefore, market capitalization of foreign ownership is indeed increasing regardless of 
the decreased ownership level. The industry classification is based on GICS (Global Industry 
Classification Standard). Regarding industry classification of listed firms in the sample, 
there are majority of listed firms from Capital goods (Electrical and machinery), Materials 
(Chemicals and construction), and Food, Beverage and Tobacco. From the sample, we also 
find larger percentage of foreign ownership in real estate, pharmaceutical and consumer 
service industries. 
V. Empirical results and additional tests
5.1 Relationship between foreign ownership and firm value
5.1.1 Empirical results
In this section, we examine the relationships between foreign ownership of the 
listed firms and the firm performances. Following Petersen (2009), we employ robust OLS 
regressions clustered at firm level to control for heteroskedasticity within firms. To measure 
firm-level performances, we choose Tobin’s Q (market-based performance) and ROA (financial 
accounting performance) as two performance indicators that are also used in previous studies 
(McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Chung and Pruitt, 1994, Khanna and Palepu, 1999; Ferris 
and Park 2005; Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). The two indicators are then used as dependent 
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variables of the regressions. 
The most important independent variable is foreign ownership. In the estimations, we 
use two indexes to represent ownership by foreign investors. The first index is normal foreign 
ownership that associates with percentage of total firm shares owned by foreign investors. 
The second index is weighted foreign ownership which is a ratio of firm’s weight in foreign 
portfolio in comparison with the firm’s weight in market portfolio. The weighted foreign 
ownership index is additionally used alongside with normal foreign ownership index because 
it controls for differences in the value of investment amounts made by foreign investors in 
different firms (Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Chan et al., 2009). For instance, 50% foreign 
ownership in a listed firm with market capitalization of US$10 million is significantly different 
from 10% foreign ownership in other listed firm with market capitalization of US$100 million.   
The regression model is as follows.
Performances jt = α  + β 1Fow jt + β 2Squared_fow jt + β 3State jt + β 4Family jt + β 5Assets jt +
 β 6Firm_age jt + β 7List_place jt + β 8List_year jt + β 9Equity/Asset jt
 + β 10Year and industry dummies jt + ε jt .  (1)
where dependent variables are Tobin’s Q and ROA, ε jt is error term. Independent 
variables consist of Fow jt is percentage of foreign ownership of firm j in year t; Squared_fow jt 
is squared term of foreign ownership of firm j; State jt is dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 
is controlled by the State (larger than 51% ownership), 0 otherwise; Family jt dummy variable 
that equals 1 if firm is controlled by founding family or individual founding member; Assets  jt 
is logarithm of total assets; Firm_age jt is logarithm of firm age since incorporation; List_loca jt 
is dummy variable that equals 1 if firm is listing in HOSE, 0 in HNX; List_year jt is logarithm of 
year of listing; Equity/Asset jt is measured by total equities to total assets.
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Table 3: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances using normal foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA   ROA ROA
Fow 2.632*** 3.098*** 2.443*** 18.43** 27.12*** 20.54**
(0.760) (0.870) (0.649) (8.519) (9.064) (8.725)
Squared_fow -4.132** -4.798** -4.361*** -30.440 -43.06* -33.10*
(1.787) (1.871) (1.501) (20.880) (21.930) (20.040)
State 0.021 0.020                1.793** 1.305 
(0.091) (0.074)                (0.907) (0.859)
Family -0.034 -0.012                -0.235 -0.483 
(0.096) (0.091)                (0.979) (0.981)
Assets -0.057 0.0683**                -0.945*** 0.317 
(0.037) (0.031)                (0.325) (0.324)
Firm_age -0.011 0.031                1.088** 1.561***
(0.044) (0.035)                (0.505) (0.489)
List_place -0.135                -2.308***
(0.082)                (0.800)
List_year 0.139                2.791***
(0.150)                (0.800)
Equity/Asset 0.0154***                0.184***
(0.002)                (0.022)
Intercept 0.269* 1.415* -2.179*** 6.130*** 19.95*** -18.79**
(0.142) (0.756) (0.749) (1.481) (6.896) (7.450)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1241 1202 1129 1259 1220 1147
R^2 0.362 0.365 0.508 0.069 0.114 0.289
Adj. R^2 0.355 0.356 0.5 0.059 0.102 0.277
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Results of Table 3 show that there is a significant relationship between foreign 
ownership and firm performances at 1% level. Except for results of Model 4, other results 
are significant and similar for both normal and weighted foreign ownership. Particularly, 
the significant and positive (negative) signs of estimated coefficients of foreign ownership 
(its squared term) variables in all other five Models indicate that the foreign-ownership and 
performance relationship exists in an inverted U shaped form. The results suggest that firm 
performances become better along side with the increase in level of foreign ownership, but 
when foreign ownership exceeds a turning point(8), firm performances start decreasing. 
(8) The turning points are considered optimal ownership level of foreign investors in the market context.
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Magnitudes of the coefficients show that turning points for the inverted U shaped relationship 
in case of Tobin’s Q and ROA (Model 3 and Model 6) are 32% and 31%, respectively. Foreign 
ownership below the level (31%-32%) relates to higher performances, while foreign ownership 
above the level correlates to lower performances. In detail, if there is 1% change (100 basis 
points) in foreign ownership of lower or upper 31%-32% level, Tobin’s Q increases by 0.024 or 
decrease by 0.024, respectively. Similarly, 1% change (100 basis points) in foreign ownership of 
lower or upper 31%-32% level relates to 0.20% increase or decrease in ROA, respectively. 
Table 4: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm performances using weighted 
foreign owneship ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA ROA
Weighted Fow 0.531*** 0.625*** 0.493*** 3.656** 5.378*** 4.045**
(0.153) (0.176) (0.131) (1.729) (1.836) (1.779)
Weighted Fow^2 -0.168** -0.196** -0.178*** -1.204 -1.714* -1.304 
(0.073) (0.076) (0.061) (0.860) (0.901) (0.826)
State 0.021 0.020                1.827** 1.288 
(0.091) (0.074)                (0.909) (0.864)
Family -0.034 -0.012                -0.302 -0.533 
(0.096) (0.091)                (0.977) (0.981)
Assets -0.057 0.0683**                -0.916*** 0.339 
(0.037) (0.031)                (0.324) (0.324)
Firm_age -0.011 0.031                1.046** 1.522***
(0.044) (0.035)                (0.502) (0.486)
List_place -0.135                -2.297***
(0.082)                (0.809)
List_year 0.139                2.764***
(0.150)                (0.818)
Equity/Asset 0.0154***                0.184***
(0.002)                (0.023)
Intercept 0.269* 1.415* -2.179*** 6.178*** 19.50*** -19.02**
(0.142) (0.756) (0.749) (1.484) (6.896) (7.481)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1241 1202 1129 1246 1207 1134
R^2 0.362 0.365 0.508 0.071 0.115 0.288
Adj. R^2 0.355 0.356 0.5 0.061 0.102 0.276
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
In addition to Table 3, we also use the weighted foreign ownership ratio as an alternative 
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measurement of foreign shareholdings. Table 4 shows the relationship between value-
weighted foreign ownership and firm performances. The results are less significant in the 
case of ROA, but remain strongly significant and similar to the results of Table 4 in the case of 
Tobin’s Q. Generally, it can be said that the relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performances exist in an inverted U shaped form.
The results are in line with studies of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) indicating significant non-monotonic relationship between Tobin’s Q and management 
ownership. Especially, the results align with findings of Ferris and Park (2005) who reveal 
that there is also curvilinear relation between foreign ownership and firm value in Japan (but 
with a larger turning point of 40%). Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) suggest that ownership 
by shareholders correlates with gains from monitoring or with losses from expropriations 
when their ownership exceeds a certain large level. Supporting the view on expropriation 
by controlling shareholders, Claessens et al. (2002) find that there is a positive relationship 
between ownership concentration and the probability that minority shareholders can be 
expropriated. Anachotikul (2006) provides evidences that foreign investors with majority 
ownership may retain weak corporate governance to facilitate their potential expropriation in 
Thailand. In addition, strengthening the view on monitoring effects, Khanna and Palepu (1999) 
indicate that foreign investors serve as a good monitoring function in India. 
From the country’s market, it is possible to observe various positive monitoring cases 
in point by foreign shareholders such as raising voices in General Shareholder Meetings, 
monitoring performance and challenging responsibility of board of directors, nominating 
foreigner board members and requesting higher transparency in financial reporting and 
disclosure (The World Bank, 2006). Based on the findings of previous literature and the 
market current condition, we arrive at a potential interpretation that foreign investors with 
minority shareholder rights may play effective monitoring roles to reduce agency costs of 
existing controlling shareholders in the context of weak corporate governance practices. In 
contrast, the foreign investors with enough majority shareholder powers may connect with 
expropriations toward their private benefits, going against firm efficiency(9). Particularly, 
(9) There may be another interpretation that the negative relationship between firm performance and large 
foreign shareholdings resulted from a fact that foreign investors undertake investments into poor-
performing firms through M&A. Therefore, underperformance of the firm is not necessarily resulted 
from the impacts of foreign investors. Although, we checked announcements of publicly available M&A 
deals in the market and found almost no evidences on the issue, we take the interpretation into special 
consideration for further study of the topic.
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the relationship will become more severe in environments with poor shareholder protection 
mechanisms. The results provide implications for market regulators and firm managers to take 
the best advantages of monitoring effects of foreign shareholdings(10) as well as to improve 
the corporate governance practices at market - firm levels to mitigate the negative impacts of 
potential expropriation by controlling (foreign) shareholders. 
5.1.2 Further discussion of the results
There is a concern that if ownership by foreigners is held by various minority foreign 
investors, it would be very difficult for some foreign shareholders with minority stake to 
have any influence on the behavior of invested firms. In fact, there is no evidence that 
foreign shareholders pursue collective actions or behave similarly in the real market context. 
Therefore, the interpretation of the empirical results will become weak if the concern cannot 
be probably justified. Taking the concern into careful consideration, we examine whether the 
ownership by foreigners are held by one large owner, or instead, by a collection of minority 
foreign investors. If the ownership is held by one large foreign investor, we may be able to 
presume they have the power for entrenchment. We select a list of listed firms in the sample 
that have larger than 30% of foreign ownership. The cut-off level of 30% is decided based on the 
turning point (31%-32%) of the inverted U shaped form found in the paper. And then, we check 
identities and ownership of major shareholders of listed firms in the list. We find that in nearly 
most of the cases, the largest (or second largest) shareholder of those firms is a foreign entity. 
Foreigner as the second largest shareholder is recorded in few firms which have very high 
level of government ownership. For instance: ABT (46.3%, 10.8%) - firms’ name (ticker code) 
is ABT, average foreign ownership is 46.3%, and average ownership by the largest foreign 
shareholder is 10.8%. Other firms include: BBC (48.2%, 38.6%), CII (40.8%, 10.3%), EVE (48.9%, 
16.8%), HAP (30.5%, 15.1%), IFS (48.3%, 29.6%), KDC (32.6%, 10.8%), KMR (38.8%, 21.5%), MCV 
(37.4%, 16.2), TCR (39.7%, 29.2%), TDH (36.5%, 12.1%), TKU (45.6%, 15.0%), TRI (10.1%, 13.8%), 
VFC(35.3%, 25.4%), and TYA (35.1%, 20.1%), respectively. 
The ownership information indicates that ownership held by one foreign entity in the 
firms with larger than 30% of foreign ownership is relatively high. According to financial 
regulations in the market, shareholder with 10% ownership can exercise certain power to 
influence several important aspects of invested firms. Holding majority stake of at least 
(10) As described in Table 2, 75% of listed firms in our sample have less than 14% of foreign ownership, which 
suggests that foreign ownership generally relates to good impacts on performances of Vietnam’s listed 
firms. 
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10% and being the largest (or second largest) shareholder may help the foreign investor 
facilitates conditions for entrenchment effects (expropriation) that weaken firm efficiencies. 
Therefore, for those firms, even though the behaviors of different foreign shareholders 
vary toward firm’s value maximization purpose and their collective action may not exist, the 
largest foreign shareholder among foreign investor group may demonstrate overwhelming 
majority shareholder rights to influence behaviors of the invested firms at the expenses of 
other shareholders. The realistic and analytical information on identity and ownership of 
major shareholders of high-foreign-ownership-level firms, to some extent, ease the concern 
that foreign ownership may be dispersed to various minority foreign shareholders, making 
them difficult to influence firm-related issues. It thus supports the paper’s interpretation and 
implication on the negative effects of foreign shareholders after their ownership reaches a 
certain high level.  
5.2 Determinants of foreign ownership
There are evidences that issues of concentrated ownership may mitigate investment 
attention of foreign investors (Dahlquist et al., 2003). In addition, low transparency firm 
group reduces investment of foreign investors (Khanna and Palepu, 1999). It can be said that 
current conditions of corporate governance and ownership structure of the firm affect foreign 
investment decisions. To examine the above argument and other factors influencing level of 
foreign ownership of listed firms, we continue the study by examining determinants of foreign 
ownership. 
From the sample, we can observe that the ownership structure of the Vietnam’s listed 
firms is relatively concentrated. There is generally a biggest controlling shareholder who has 
significant voting power to influence all decisions of the firms. The first one is the State with 
majority of government ownership retained in the listed firms because those firms are former 
State-Owned Enterprises. The other one is the founding family who keeps holding significant 
owner rights in the listed firms. For these firms, corporate governance may be weak due to 
the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism exercised by the second largest (or minority) 
shareholders. Consequently, conflicts of interests between minority-majority shareholders, 
and between managers and owners of those firms become more severe (Claessens et al., 
2002). 
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Table 5: Determinants of foreign ownership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fow Weighted Fow Fow Weighted Fow
ROA 0.0009* 0.0049*                
(0.001) (0.003)                
ROA (t-1) 0.0010** 0.0052**                
(0.000) (0.002)                
Tobin's Q 0.011 0.052 
(0.007) (0.033)
Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.0136*** 0.0674***
(0.005) (0.024)
Family -0.0440** -0.218** -0.0403** -0.200** 
(0.017) (0.085) (0.017) (0.083)
State -0.0607*** -0.301*** -0.0552*** -0.273***
(0.012) (0.060) (0.012) (0.058)
Assets 0.017 0.083 0.0283*** 0.140***
(0.011) (0.056) (0.005) (0.024)
Firm_age 0.003 0.012 0.005 0.025 
(0.006) (0.031) (0.006) (0.031)
List_year -0.0959*** -0.470*** -0.0951*** -0.471***
(0.017) (0.084) (0.015) (0.075)
List_place 0.0622*** 0.310*** 0.0354*** 0.175***
(0.023) (0.114) (0.013) (0.066)
Equity/Asset 0.0005* 0.002 0.0006** 0.0031** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Before 2008 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.016 
(0.009) (0.042) (0.012) (0.060)
After 2008 -0.0104* -0.0529* -0.006 -0.028 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.006) (0.028)
Industry 16 0.243*** 1.202*** 0.225*** 1.115***
(0.028) (0.139) (0.031) (0.154)
Other industry 
dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept -0.104 -0.517 -0.345*** -1.710***
(0.229) (1.141) (0.110) (0.544)
Observations 1146 1133 1116 1116
R^2 0.392 0.388 0.422 0.422
Adj. R^2 0.382 0.377 0.412 0.412
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
In this section, we try to test determinants of foreign ownership in listed firms using 
robust OLS regressions clustered at firm level. Dependent variable of Model 1, 3 is normal 
foreign ownership. While, dependent variable of Model 2, 4 is the weighted foreign ownership 
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ratio. We use either ROA or Tobin’s Q and their one-year lag values to test whether foreign 
investors pay attention to high-performing firms. Other control variables such as family and 
state dummies (representing firm ownership structure), equity to asset ratio (representing 
level of debt), assets, firm age, listing location, years of listing, year and industry dummies 
(representing other important firm’s characteristics) are included. Detail definition of the 
variables is mentioned in Specification (1) of section 5.1. 
Results of Table 5 show that there are significant and positive relationships between 
foreign ownership and firm performances (and their lag values) in Model 1, 2 that use ROA 
as measurements of firm performances. Mode 3, 4 that use Tobin’s Q only show positive 
and significant relationship in the lag values. The result supports the argument that foreign 
investors consider performance of the firm before investing. In other word, it reveals that 
high performing firms are likely to receive investments from foreign investors. The results 
enhance the argument of Ferris and Park (2005) and Nakano and Nguyen (2012) who suggest 
a causality relationship between foreign ownership and firm performance. 
Furthermore, other important results of Table 5 are links between concentrated 
ownership structure and foreign involvement. Signs of coefficients of other control variables 
reveal that foreign investors disfavor firms that have high concentration of ownership which 
is presented by dominated shares owned by the state and the founding family. The result 
aligns with findings of Khanna and Palepu (1999) that reveal lower foreign investments in 
firm groups with limited transparency and poor corporate governance; and with those of 
Giannetti and Simonov (2006) who suggest that investors are reluctant to invest in firms with 
weak corporate governance. However, the results should be interpreted with care because 
it has been argued elsewhere that the state and the founding family are generally not willing 
or relatively conservative to reduce their ownership, which are main constraints preventing 
higher shareholdings of foreign investors.
Moreover, results of Table 5 also show that foreign investors seem to prefer large firms, 
which may be due to higher firm stock liquidity and higher market reputation. They are also 
likely to participate in firms with low debt, be listed in recent years, listed in more liquid stock 
exchange(11), and in pharmaceutical industry. Overall, the findings are consistent with studies 
of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) about 
determinants of foreign ownership and controlling shareholders.
(11) Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange demonstrates higher liquidation than Hanoi Stock Exchange (HSBC, 
2010).
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5.3 Additional tests
There may be argument on endogeneity issue because foreign investors may choose 
firm with good corporate governance to invest, as suggested in the previous section (Kim et 
al., 2010). In their study, Ferris and Park (2005), Anachotikul (2006) and Nakano and Nguyen 
(2012) argue that there might be causality relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performances. Therefore, issues of the causality relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performances may distort the effects of foreign shareholders to invested firm. It is thus 
a serious matter which needs to be solved by appropriate research method. Ferris and Park 
(2005), Nakano and Nguyen (2012) have suggested some econometric methods to address the 
issue. In this section, we repeat some of their methods, as follows: 
First, as the previous researchers, we employ 2-stage least squares (2SLS) method 
with an expectation to control for the causality issue. It is important to note that choosing 
appropriate instruments in 2SLS procedure is generally the most difficult or not always 
possible task because of limitation in numbers of exogenous variables in the sample or the 
lack of theoretical supporting evidences. Given these constraints, we consider to select one-
year lag value of performances which is already used in study of Nakano and Nguyen (2012) 
as the first instrument.  In addition, we choose family firm dummy as the second instrument 
in our analysis. Panel 1 of Table 6 shows first stage regression that consists of (i) foreign 
ownership as endogenous variable and (ii) ROA (t-1) and family dummy as two instruments. 
Panel 2 of Table 6 contains similar variables as Panel 1 but ROA (t-1) replaced by Tobin’s Q 
(t-1). Second stage regressions in Panel 3 of Table 6 show that there is significant inverted U 
shaped relationship between foreign ownership and ROA (not for the case of Tobin’s Q). In 
addition, significant results of Hausman tests lead to the conclusion that the foreign ownership 
variable is endogenous, suggesting the validity of the IVs. The results confirm our previous 
findings. In other words, firms with higher foreign ownership underperform those without. 
However, the magnitudes of coefficients of foreign ownership and its squared term climb to a 
relatively unreasonable level, which should be interpreted with caution(12). 
(12) As methods used in Ferris and Park (2005), Nakano and Nguyen (2012), we also employ 2-stage least 
squares (2SLS) with foreign ownership as endogenous variable and one-year lag values of performances 
as instrument. However, 2SLS regression results of the inverted U shaped relationship are not 
significant.
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Second, for other robustness check(13)(14) of the empirical findings on the effect of the 
state or the family control, we use the ratio of shares held by these entities instead of their 
dummy variables. Since there are no sufficient data on ownership of founding family, we only 
use government ownership (and its squared term) as new independent variables. Table 7 
displays the new empirical results. The results remain unchanged and significant at 5% and 
1% level in term of Tobin’s Q (consistent in signs of coefficients but not significant in case of 
ROA), supporting the inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and firm 
performances. Lastly, we use Wald tests to check model specification. The significant results 
confirm suitability in the selection of the nonlinear regression models.
Table 6: 2SLS and validitty of the IVs
Panel 1: First stage Panel 2: First stage Panel 3: Second stage
Endogenous and dependent 
variable: Fow
Endogenous and dependent 
variable: Fow
(1) (2)
Fow Coef. Robust SD Fow Coef. Robust SD ROA Tobin's Q
ROA (t-1) 0.001** 0.000 Tobin's Q (t-1) 0.017*** 0.006 Fow 707.2*** 87.330 
Family -0.058*** 0.011 Family -0.054*** 0.011 (238.600) (81.940)
List_place 0.064*** 0.012 List_place 0.039*** 0.009 Squared_fow -1573.8*** -198.600 
State -0.062*** 0.008 State -0.057*** 0.008 (580.900) (196.100)
Assets 0.019*** 0.006 Assets 0.029*** 0.003 List_place -9.785*** -1.193 
List_year 0.012*** 0.005 List_year 0.013*** 0.004 (3.567) (0.943)
Equity/Asset 0.001*** 0.000 Equity/Asset 0.001*** 0.000 State 5.002* 0.433 
Intercept -0.384*** 0.118 Intercept -0.598*** 0.074 (2.573) (0.398)
Year dummy Yes Year dummy Yes Assets -4.479*** -0.382 
Industry dummy Yes Industry dummy Yes (1.619) (0.371)
Observations 1,171 Observations 1,141 List_year -1.687 -0.284 
F (17, 1153) 33.760*** F (17, 1123) 36.41*** (1.487) (0.272)
R^2 0.330 R^2 0.361 Equity/Asset 0.020 -0.001 
Adj. R^2 0.320 Adj. R^2 0.351 (0.071) (0.012)
Root MSE 0.112 Root MSE 0.108 Intercept 70.12** 5.245 
(29.190) (5.734)
Year dummy Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes
Observations 1,171 1,141
Wald Chi2(17) 36.460*** 34.880***
Tests of endogeneity
Robust score chi2(2) 65.436*** 19.377***
Robust regression 
F(2,1151)
22.214*** 8.733***
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
(13) We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this robustness check. 
(14) Following Ferris and Park (2005), we use different cut-off levels of foreign ownership (5%, 10%, 25%, 35%, 
and 49%) as independent dummy variables in the piecewise linear regressions to examine relationship 
between the foreign ownership and Tobin’s Q. However, no significant results are found.
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Table 7: Relationship between foreign ownership and firm perforamnces using normal 
foreign ownership and new government ownership variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA   ROA
Fow 2.044*** 2.117*** 16.270 19.16*  
(0.705) (0.694) (9.954) (9.861)
Squared_fow -3.234** -3.393** -20.010 -27.210 
(1.589) (1.570) (22.360) (22.440)
Gow 0.870** 0.462*** 22.89*** 6.717***
(0.408) (0.138) (5.741) (1.898)
Squared_gow -0.664 -26.23***                
(0.571) (7.879)                
Family 0.127 0.103 1.861 0.896 
(0.097) (0.095) (1.327) (1.243)
Assets 0.048 0.041 0.547 0.316 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.354) (0.373)
Firm_age -0.011 -0.008 1.473*** 1.609***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.555) (0.559)
List_place -0.119 -0.111 -2.614*** -2.382***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.839) (0.876)
List_year 0.104 0.098 3.230*** 2.939***
(0.135) (0.133) (0.906) (0.965)
Equity/Asset 0.0145*** 0.0144*** 0.196*** 0.193***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.023) (0.023)
Intercept -1.773** -1.612** -27.35*** -22.11** 
(0.703) (0.659) (8.418) (8.663)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1129 1129 1147 1147
R^2 0.509 0.508 0.31 0.298
Adj. R^2 0.497 0.497 0.294 0.283
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
VI. Conclusion
Interested in the relationship between foreign ownership and firm-level performances 
in emerging countries, the study uses data of listed firms from 2006-2010 in Vietnam for the 
research target. Vietnam is an ideal context for the empirical setting because it is an emerging 
country with nascent and a recently-opened capital market that contains specific institutional 
characteristics. 
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We find that there is an inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership 
and firm performances measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. The non-monotonic relationship is 
consistent with corporate governance theory on the gains from monitoring effects and the 
losses from expropriations by shareholders when their ownership reaches a certain large 
level (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). In addition, the results are also in line with those of 
Morck et al., (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) that indicate a curvilinear relationship 
between management ownership and firm market valuation. The results also align with those 
of Ferris and Park (2005) that find similar foreign-value relationship in Japan, and with those 
of Khanna and Palepu (1999) that reveal monitoring effects of foreign investors in India. Even 
though, the study does not provide direct evidences explaining for the relationship, based on 
previous evidences on the same subject and the market’s context, we interpret our results that 
foreign investors holding minority ownership may play effective monitoring roles to mitigate 
agency problems caused by existing controlling shareholders. On the other hand, foreign 
investors with enough majority ownership may use their powers for entrenchment. It also 
seems that the inverted U shaped relationship is applied well in emerging countries with weak 
corporate governance and poor shareholder protection regime.  
Furthermore, we also find that foreign investors disfavor firms with a high concentration 
of ownership that relates to an image of weak corporate governance. Importantly, we find that 
foreign investors prefer high-performing firms, which lead to a causality relationship between 
foreign ownership and firm performances. We use additional tests to address the issues but 
weakly significant results are found, especially in the case of firm performance measured by 
ROA. It may thus require further studies for the endogeneity issues. In addition, the identities 
of foreign owners may be needed for further investigation. Lastly, there are empirical 
evidences on determinants of foreign investment. 
The study contributes on the current corporate governance literature by providing 
additional evidences on the inverted U shaped relationship between foreign ownership and 
firm performances in an emerging country where there is rare empirical evidences on the 
theme. The results suggest that foreign ownership does not always relate with positive impacts 
and their effects thus should be evaluated under appropriate analyses. The study also provides 
implications for market regulators and firm managers to (i) improve corporate governance 
practices of listed firms for the potential reduction of expropriation risks caused by controlling 
shareholders, (ii) realize positive effects (monitoring) of foreign investors at either firm or 
country level, and (iii) further develop the country’s nascent capital market by attracting more 
external funds.
“Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy”
— 308 —
*Acknowledgement: 
I would like to especially thank the anonymous referee for the very helpful comments.
I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Katsuyuki Kubo for his 
continued encouragement, most useful academic guidance and valuable comments during the 
research process. The paper benefited from useful discussions from participants at Waseda 
Student Research Seminar. I am also indebted to Mr. Chairman, Executive Managers of 
Saigon Securities Incorporation (SSI) and friends at Investment Banking Division, the SSI 
for providing an excellent working and research environment during my internship at the 
organization (March 2011), which helped me update conditions of Vietnam’s financial market.
References
1. Ahmadijan C, Robbins G. A clash of capitalism: foreign shareholders and corporate restructuring in 1990s 
Japan. American Sociological Review 2005; 70; 451-471.
2. Ananchotikul S. Do foreign investment improve corporate governance? Evidence from Thailand. 
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley 2006. 
3. Berle A and Means C. The modern corporation and private property. Macmillan, New York 1932. 
4. Bekaert G, Harvey, C. Foreign speculator and emerging equity markets. The Journal of Finance 2000; 2; 
565-613.     
5. Benfratello L, Sembenelli A. Foreign ownership and productivity: Is the direction of causality is so obvious. 
International Journal of industrial Organization 2006; 24; 733-751.
6. Bloomberg. The 14 Most Exciting Frontier Markets in The World. Bloomberg Markets 2012. 
7. Chan K, Covrig V, Ng L. Does home bias af fect firm value? Evidence from holding of mutual funds 
worldwide. Journal of International Economics 2009; 78; 230-241.
8. Chen G, Fir th M., Xu L. Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed 
companies. Journal of Banking and Finance 2009; 33; 171-181.
9. Chung K, Pruitt S. A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q. Financial Management 1994; 23:3; 70-74.
10. Claessens S. Equity portfolio investment in developing countries: a literature survey. Working Paper 
Series, International Economics Department, The World Bank 1993.  
11. Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J, Lang L. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large 
shareholdings Journal of Fiannce 2002, 57, 2741-2771. 
12. Dahlquist M, Pinkowitz L, Stulz R, Williamson R. Corporate Governance and the home bias. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2003; 38; 87-110. 
13. Dahlquist M, Robertsson G. Direct foreign ownership, institutional investor and firm characteristics. 
Journal of Financial Economics 2001; 59; 413-440.
14. David G, Alessandra G, Zhihong Y. The more the better? Foreign ownership and corporate performance in 
China. University of Nottingham 2006.
15. Demsetz H, Lehn K. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political 
Economy 1985; 93; 6.
“Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy”
— 309 —
16. Doms M, and Jensen J. Comparing wages, skills, and productivity between domestically and foreign-owned 
manufacturing establishment in the United State. Geography and Ownership as Bases for Economic 
Accounting; University of Chicago Press 1998.  
17. Errunza V. Foreign portfolio equity investments, financial liberalization, and economic development. 
Review of International Economics 2001, 9:4, 703-726.
18. Ferris S, Park K. Foreign ownership and firm value: evidence from Japan. Advances in Financial 
economics 2005, 11, 1-29.
19. Giannetti M and Simonov A. Which investors fear expropriation? Evidence from investor’s portfolio 
choices. The Journal of Finance 2006, 3, 1507-1547. 
20. Gul F, Kim J, Qiu A. Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price 
synchronicity: evidence from China. Journal of Financial Economics 2010; 95; 425-442.
21. Guo S and Fraser M. Propensity score analysis: statistical methods and applications. Advanced 
Quantitative Techniques in the Social Science Series 2008. 
22. HSBC. Vietnam insights: take a fresh look. Equity Strategy November 2010. HSBC Global Research 2010.
23. HSBC. Vietnam at a glance. Economics Vietnam Macro, HSBC Global Research 2012.  
24. IFC. Corporate governance manual in Vietnam – second edition. Vietnam Corporate Governance Project, 
the World Bank 2010. 
25. Jensen M and Meckling W. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership 
structure. Journal of Financial Economics 1976, 3, 305-360.
26. Kang J, Stulz M. Why is there home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan. 
Journal of Financial Economics 1997; 46; 3-28.
27. Khanna T and Palepu K. Emerging market business groups, foreign investors, and corporate governance. 
NBER Working Paper Series 1999, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
28. Kim I, Kim J, Kim W, Byun S. Foreign investor and corporate governance in Korea. Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 2010; 18; 390-402.
29. Kolasa M, Rubaszek M, Taglioni D. Firms in the great global recession: the role of foreign ownership and 
financial independence. Emerging Markets Review 2010; 11; 341-357.
30. La Porta R, Lopez-De-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 
1999; 2; 471-517.
31. Lin, Chihuang, Shiu C. Foreign ownership in Taiwan stock market – an empirical analysis. Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 2003; 13; 19-41.
32. McConnell J, Servaes H. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of 
Financial Economics 1990; 27; 595-612. 
33. McGee R. Corporate governance in Asia: a comparative study. Working Paper Series, College of Business 
Administration, Florida International University 2008. 
34. Merrill Lynch. Asian Insights. Market report 2006.
35. Mishra A, Ratti R. Governance, monitoring and foreign investment in China companies. Emerging Market 
Review 2011; 12; 171-188. 
36. Morck R, Shleifer A and Vishny R. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 1988, 20, 293-315.
37. Nakano M, Nguyen P. Foreign ownership and firm performance: evidence from Japan’s electronics 
industry. Applied Financial Economics 2012, 23:1, 41-50. 
“Foreign ownership and performance of listed firms: evidence from an emerging economy”
— 310 —
38. Nguyen DT, Nguyen TP, Nguyen J. Vietnam’s SCIC: a gradualist approach to sovereign wealth funds. 
Journal of Asia Pacific Economy 2012, 17:2, 268-283.
39. Oxelheim L, Randoy T. The impact of foreign board membership on firm value. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 2003; 27; 2369-2392. 
40. Petersen R. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Review of 
Financial Studies 2009, 22, 435-480.
41. Shleifer A, Vishny R. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 1988; 94; 461-
488.
42. Shleifer A, Vishny R. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 1997; 42; 737-783. 
43. Tesar L, Werner I. Home bias and high turnover. Journal of International Money and Finance 1995; 14; 
467-492.
44. Thanh V and Quang P. Managing capital flows: the case of Vietnam. ADB Institute Discussion Paper 
No.105, ADB Institute, 2008.  
45. The World Bank. Corporate governance, country assessment, Vietnam. Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) 2006. 
46. VCS. Strategy report: Vietnam prospective in 2012. Viet Capital Securities 2012.
47. Villalonga B and Amit R. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of 
Economics 2006; 80; 385-417.
